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Abstract— The Software Defined Networking (SDN) 
paradigm decouples control and data planes, offering high 
programmability and a global view of the network. However, it is 
a challenge not only provide security in these next generation 
networks as well as allow that network attacks could be subjected 
to an incident and forensic treatment procedure. This paper 
proposes the implementation of flexible mechanisms of 
monitoring and treatment of security events categorized per type 
of attack and associated with whitelist and blacklist resources by 
means of the SDN controller programmability. The resources to 
perform intrusion and attack analysis are validated by means of 
a real SDN/OpenFlow testbed. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Current computer networks do not meet some newer 
requirements and present new demands that need to be rethink. 
According to [1] the absence of flexibility in controlling the 
internal operation of the equipment as well as the high cost of 
existing infrastructure are barriers to the evolution of 
architecture and the necessary innovation in the provision of 
new services and network applications. One of the initiatives in 
this direction is the Software Defined Network (SDN) 
paradigm that is in most cases based on the OpenFlow protocol 
[2]. SDN typically employ a controller to install, on demand, 
packet forwarding rules per flow in the network nodes [3]. 
Despite the advantages brought by the SDN networks, some of 
the vulnerabilities of traditional networks persist in SDN-based 
infrastructures, such as the typically centralized nature of the 
control plane, added to the fact that many of the tools and 
techniques used for security information as anti-virus and 
firewall are not sufficient to ensure safety [4]. The intrusion 
detection technologies, adequately integrated with the SDN 
environment, can provide an additional security element [5].  
The use of OpenFlow in network security area considering 
analysis and intrusion prevention has been discussed and 
presented good results in previous research. For example, 
Lopes et al. [6]  proposes BroFlow, an elastic and distributed 
IDPS (Intrusion Detection Prevention System) for defense 
against DoS attacks in virtualized SDN, that is  based on the 
OpenFlow API and network traffic analyzer Bro. Jankowski et 
al. [7] presented a solution where the outcome was based on 
the assumption that it is possible to classify whether network 
traffic flows represent normal operation or attack and the flows 
classification is based on features obtained through the 
functionality available in the SDN technology. Xing et al. [8] 
presented the SnortFlow, a proposal for IPS in a cloud 
environment, with XEN using OpenFlow switches to assist in 
capturing traffic. In this study, authors developed a prototype in 
which the SnortFlow agent was installed in the areas Sun 0 and 
Dom U.  
Many of these works cover general features of SDN 
networks protection without making a demonstration with real 
network equipment, generating results using either simulation 
tools or prototypes. Thus, the purpose of this work is, firstly, to 
extend the related works through the implementation of an 
additional flexible mechanisms for monitoring and treatment of 
security events categorized per type of attack and associated 
with whitelist and blacklist resources. Secondly, the proposed 
solution will provide mechanisms to perform intrusion and 
attacks analysis with validation by means of a real SDN-
OpenFlow testbed.  Regarding the methodology used, it is 
characterized as an applied case study that explores the 
programmability of the SDN controllers in a real testbed. The 
focus is on validating the proposal itself and its implemented 
mechanisms for detection and reaction to future use at the 
Salvador University (UNIFACS) FIBRE network [9].  
II. THE PROPOSED SYSTEM 
SDN enables more flexible and predictable network control 
and makes it easier to extend the network with new 
functionality through the programmability of the controller. In 
this context, this work employs Ryu as the application coding 
platform for the control plane. Ryu is one of the controllers on 
the market developed by the Center for Innovation in Software 
(NTT Japan) under Apache 2.0 license [10].  Ryu project is a 
framework based on software programming components that 
uses Python as the programming language and allows the 
development of new applications using multiple SDN 
protocols, including OpenFlow 1.0, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4.  
As shown in Figure 1, two applications were implemented 
on top of the Ryu controller. The first is Snort_Switch 
(switch_snort.py) which is the main code supporting a L2 
Switch and responsible for enabling the OpenFlow Switch to 
redirect all traffic in promiscuous mode from one of its ports, 
set up for the Snort tool itself.  The second application, called 
“mitigation” (mitigation.py), aims to address the Packet_event 
messages sent from Snort tool to Ryu controller when it is 
reported some event associated with an attack signature in the 
OpenFlow network. These two applications are intended to 
provide at the control plane the resources needed to implement 
the mechanisms of detection and response. The 
packet_in_handler is the main method in the switch.py file, 
where are processed all OpenFlow messages. In this method it 
is expected to allow the creation of flow entries in switches 
only if the MAC Source of a Packet_in message was registered 
previously in the Whitelist and not be in the Blacklist. In this 
method is also developed the treatment for Packet_event 
messages sent by Snort. 
 
FIGURE 1: RYU-BASED SYSTEM CODE BUILDING BLOCKS 
The proposed concept is based on the SDN flow 
classification mechanism by type of traffic as shown in Table 
1. An important aspect of this approach is the test environment 
for the generation of SDN network traffic, allowing verifying 
the effectiveness of the treatment mechanisms by type of 
attack.  
TABLE 1: TRAFFIC CLASSES EXISTING IN THE REAL TESTBED [6] 
Traffic 
Class 
Activities Example of 
activities 
Tools for traffic 
generation 
Class 1 Normal 
Communication 
between clients 
and server 
FTP, SSH, SMB, Apache, 
WEB, Postgres, Telnet, 
Ping ICMP 
Class 2 Probe 
Port probe, 
vulnerability and 
version scan 
Metasploit, nmap 
Class 3 DoS Denial of service Metasploit, hping3, nping 
 
Table 2 shows the possible actions that have been 
programmed into the Ryu controller after identifying a 
suspicious network traffic. Three methods are essential to carry 
out the treatment of security events set out in Table 2 and allow 
for each type of class of attack a specific action or set of 
actions.   
TABLE 2: FLEXIBLE TREATMENT OF SECURITY EVENTS 
Traffic 
Class 
Activities Action Type of treatment 
Class 1 Normal 
Only 
detection 
1. only storage in database 
Class 2 
 
Probe 
Detection and 
Reaction 
1. store in database 
2. REWRITE flow entries 
Class 3 
 
DoS 
Detection and 
Reaction 
1. store in database 
2. DROP flow entries 
3. MAC Source in Blacklist 
 
For the types of Class 3 attack the treatment it is given by 
remove_table_flows  method, programmed in mitigation.py file 
to send a command to the Switch to drop all flow entries that 
have the MAC address of the attack source and inserting this 
MAC in the blacklist, blocking the traffic and preventing new 
connections of the suspect device. 
The type of attack Class 2 is considered by 
modify_table_flow method, defined in mitigacao.py file, that 
was programmed to send a command to Switch to rewrite all 
flow entries that have the MAC address of the attack source 
and redirect the traffic to port 4 of the Switch connect to  a 
honeypot to deceive the attacker and understand (analyze) the 
used attack signature. In relation to the treatment of attack 
traffic Class 1, they are processed by Snort itself. In this case, 
they are detected by means of Snort rules and only performs 
the action of storing all traffic in the database such that they 
can be analyzed in the future using the Basic Analysis and 
Security Engine (BASE) tool.  
III. REAL SDN NETWORK TESTBED 
The SDN network in Figure 2 shows the equipment and 
framework components necessary to implement and validate 
the flexible Intrusion Detection and Treatment System (IDTS) 
proposed. 
A. Description of the SDN network testbed 
The experimentation network shown in Figure 2 uses a TP-
Link (1) WR1043ND hardware, which is a wireless router 
approved by OpenWRT.org and [11] to operate as a low cost 
OpenFlow switch. To support the OpenFlow 1.3 protocol, 
necessary in the proposal, the equipment had its firmware 
changed and received the OpenWrt operating system version 
compiled from version "trunk" of OpenWRT (Barrier Breaker) 
[12].  
The experimentation setup has three different networks: the 
SDN network |IP 172.16.10.0/24| which basically connects the 
hosts in the OpenFlow network. For the test it was used two 
real machines as network clients, being one with the operating 
system Linux Kali |IP 172.16.10.251| (2) connected to port 4 of 
the Switch OpenFlow to simulate some attacks. The other 
machine is the one under attack (3) with Ubuntu Server 16.04. 
It was also employed one honeypot machine (4) emulating 
machines on the network by means of the honeyd tool, a low 
interaction honeypot. Machine server (5) runs the OpenFlow 
network Ryu controller |IP 192.1681.130/24|. The experimental 
setup includes protection mechanisms associated with whitelist 
(6) and blacklist (7) features, to demonstrate the effectiveness 
of the solution. The Ryu controller supports a Switch L2 with 
integration features with Snort tool using the controller 
programming flexibility. The Snort machine (8) has eth0 
interface configured in promiscous mode (9) that receives all 
traffic on port 3 of the OpenFlow Switch in mirror mode (10), 
and eth1 configured on the |IP 192.168.1.120| to send packets 
of the type Packet_event (11) to Ryu controller when a 
malicious traffic is identified in the network.   
The detection and reaction mechanisms are implemented by 
coding at the file mitigacao.py in the controller which handles 
events Packet_event generated by Snort and that are sent to the 
Ryu controller through an application developed in python 
called pigrelay (12) available in [13]. The pigrelay tool is 
running on the Snort machine and when executed sends to the 
controller in the |IP 192.168.1.130| and port |51234| - security 
events being generated by Snort tool and stored in 
/var/log/snort/snort_alert. To enable the storage of data 
generated by Snort tool it was used a MySQL database 
manager. For security reasons, all access to the network 
controller is made by a single management console (13). 
 
FIGURE 2: REAL SDN-OPENFLOW TESTBED 
IV. VALIDATION OF THE PROTECTION MECHANISM 
This section presents a brief description of the strategies 
adopted and implemented in the real SDN Network testbed and 
the validation of the protection mechanisms. The results 
obtained in the tests will be presented as command outputs of 
the Ryu controller that was running in verbose mode. The 
BASE tool is used as analysis tool for the alerts generated by 
Snort and available on the real SDN network testbed. For all 
attack simulation detected by Snort, an alert by means 
Packet_event message is sent to the network controller. The 
controller by means of application mitigation.py extracts alert 
information seeking the flow that matched with the alert the 
alert received.  
A. Whitelist and blacklist  
The creation of a flow entry in the switch will only succeed 
if the source MAC address is previously registered. As shown 
in Figure 3, for example, a device with a MAC address |68: 5b: 
35: b4: fc: bf| when requesting the creation of an entry flow by 
means a Packet_in message had its request denied and was told 
to contact the administrator network.  The authorized MAC 
address (Figure 3) are registered previously in whitelist.txt file 
in the directory of the Ryu, read and cached in a list created 
when executing the switch_snort.py file.  
 
FIGURE 3: BLOCKING OF UNAUTHORIZED MAC ADDRESS 
The blacklist is implemented by the blacklist.txt file 
available in Ryu code folder. It records all MAC addresses 
that have had some kind of activity considered suspect in the 
OpenFlow network previously. The insertion of new addresses 
in blacklist.txt file is made in the treatment of Class 3 security 
events and allows to block new access for the node that 
originated an attack.  At runtime, when a device requests the 
creation of a flow entry to the controller, a method in 
mitigation.py file is programmed to read the blacklist.txt file 
and identify if the MAC address of the device is on the list. If 
a device is requesting the creation of a flow entry through a 
Packet_in message, for example, the message is not handled 
by the controller and the MAC address is considered suspect, 
as shown in Figure 4. 
 
FIGURE 4: BLOCKING A SUSPECT MAC ADDRESS 
B. Class 1 attack  
For traffic generation, it was used a ICMP ping to test 
normal traffic on the network from the attacker’s machine:  
#ping 172.16.10.2 
As show in Figure 5, the normal traffic is subject to 
detecting and recording by means of creating a Snort rule 
classified as type Class 1. The treatment programmed in the 
controller for any traffic type Class 1 consists only in detect this 
traffic and record it in database for future analysis using the 
BASE tool.  
 
FIGURE 5: ICMP DETECTED (NORMAL TRAFFIC) 
C. Class 2 attack  
For generation of traffic was used the nmap tool from the 
attacker’s machine to test probe traffic on the network:  
# nmap -sX -O 172.16.10.2 
The tests conducted here consist in identify the type of 
attacks classified in the proposal as Class 2 and that were 
properly configured in Snort rules in rules.local file are being 
detected and the reaction mechanism consists of a call to 
modify_tables_flow.py method. This method executes the 
action to submit a REWRITE message to the Openflow switch 
with the objective to rewrite all flow entries that have the MAC 
address that originated the attack to the port switch 4 connected 
to a honeypot.  When sending the message to the Switch, the 
method knows the MAC of the device that originated the 
attack by Packet_event message from Snort, which contains 
all the attack information, which are loaded in 
modify_tables_flow.py method as parameters (Figure 6). 
In this way, it is possible to redirect all traffic to the port 4 
of the switch redirecting all traffic and effectively 
implementing a trap for the attacker with the purpose of 
gathering information about the attack in progress. 
 
 
FIGURE 6: CLASS 2 DETECTED (PROBE TRAFFIC) 
D. Class 3 attacks  
The hping3 tool is an injector of packets used to perform 
stress tests on the network, allowing simulate DoS (Denial of 
Service) and DDoS (Distributed DOS) attacks. For simulation 
purposes, we used the following command in the attacker's 
machine: 
# hping3 -S -p 80 --flood --rand-source 172.16.10.2 
The test conducted here consists in identify the type of 
attacks classified in the proposal as Class 3. When sending to 
the controller (Figure 7) the Packet_event message identifying 
the probe test as Class 3, the controller through mitigacao.py 
code makes a call to drop_tables_flow.py method. This 
method performs the action of sending a DROP message to 
the OpenFlow switch with the purpose to remove all flow 
entries that have the MAC address that originated the attack. 
 
FIGURE 7: DOS ATTACK DETECTED (DOS TRAFFIC) 
When sending the message to the Switch, the method 
knows the MAC of the device that originated the attack by 
Packet_event message from Snort, which contains all the 
attack information, which are loaded in drop_tables_flow.py 
method as parameters. As a result, the method removes all 
entries flow, interrupting the attack.  However, only this action 
is not effective, because new requests for the device to create 
new flow entries would be made and it would keep the 
connection to the network. To avoid this, our approach 
proposes, as a second reaction mechanism for the Class 3 type 
attack, to associate the DROP action with the insertion of the 
MAC address that originated the attack on the blacklist. In this 
way, after any kind of malicious action is detected by a 
particular network node with this node being blacklisted, it 
becomes virtually impossible a NEW access, since the network 
policy follows the default “deny-by-default” premise.  The 
estimated time between the identification of the type of attack, 
sending of Packet_event message to the controller and 
treatment given by drop_tables_flow.py method is taking an 
average of 2 to 3 seconds (Figure 8).  
 
FIGURE 8: TRAFFIC MONITORING OF THE INTERFACE ETH2  
That time presents in the Figure 8 is the necessary time to 
stop the attack and avoid compromising the OpenFlow 
network and validates the reaction mechanisms.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The Intrusion Detection and Treatment System (IDTS) 
proposal with its redirecting, mitigation and deceiving attacker 
security approach innovates and provides flexibilization, 
particularly in relation to the current intrusion detection using 
an IDS on a conventional style. This flexible technique, now 
associated with a network control mechanisms (SDN 
architecture/OpenFlow), allows an innovative way, not only to 
monitoring and detect potential attacks, as well as a "reaction" 
to the threats in a controlled and centrally manner. In effect, the 
validation tests reported illustrated only some of the possible 
protection approaches with the inclusion in the whitelist and 
reaction approaches with the inclusion in the blacklist and 
signaling to the administrator. Future works should include the 
use of others IDS on an architecture with more than one 
OpenFlow Switch to provide load balancing among other 
potential alternatives. The flexibility of the approach proposed 
reflects also the fact that we are proposing to secure a network 
with a logically centralized view and control although the 
controller itself might be fully distributed as commonly 
possible and frequently adopted on a SDN/OpenFlow network. 
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